November 21-23, 2013

Conference on Values


John Leslie Mackie famously declared that there are no objective values and defended an error theory for evaluative judgments. Impressed by the phenomenology of value experience and our everyday evaluative discourse, we are not fully convinced.
The second conference within the framework of the DFG-project “Emotions and Values” therefore deals with two central questions. The first question is the basic ontological question whether there are any values – or better: whether there are any (instantiated) evaluative properties. Are they part of the furniture of the world? This basic question is naturally followed by a second one concerning the nature of evaluative properties. What are they? Are they monadic, mind-independent properties as the strict realist believes or are they in some sense to be specified relational, mind-dependent properties? The two questions are intimately related. For some of those who answer the first question to the negative, the second question seems more or less meaningless. For others, in contrast, this second question may still make sense because they construe evaluative properties as mind-dependent but accept only mind-independent properties as genuinely real. Hence there is a multitude of possible positions.

Invited Speakers

  • Ralf Bader (Oxford)
  • Filippo Contesi (York)
  • Jonathan Dancy (Austin)
  • Christoph Halbig (Giessen)
  • Olivier Massin (Genf)
  • Andreas Müller (Berlin)
  • Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (Lund)
  • András Szigeti (Lund/Tromsø)

Conference chair


Organizational support

For any queries about a conference, please send us an email at



November 08-10, 2012

Emotion and Perception

Forum Scientiarum, Tübingen

In modern theory of emotion the claim that emotions are analogous to perceptions or even a special form of perception is widespread. Emotions and perceptions are said to share important aspects: they both essentially have a phenomenal aspect, they persist in the light of better knowledge and they seem to occupy similar epistemic roles – as perceptions give us access to descriptive features of our environment and justify perceptual judgments, emotions seem to help us to “see” what is of import or value or even what is the right thing to do and justify the corresponding evaluative judgments. However, emotions and perceptions also differ in important aspects as Ronald de Sousa already noticed. The most obvious difference is the absence of sensory organs in the case of the emotions and of course, there are even more sophisticated and threatening disanalogies – one does not have to look far for criticism. As widespread as the link between emotion and perception in modern theory of emotion is, it is only rarely critically examined. The conference’s aim is to fill this gap in the theory of emotion and seriously to explore this link between emotion and perception with all its pros and cons and to mark out its possibilities and limits.

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    • anikalutz

      As female philosophers we are always concerned about gender equality and issues of diversity.
      In the course of our last conference on emotion and perception four of ten talks were held by female philosophers.
      For our conference on values we invited philosophers from at least five different countries and it happened that none of them is female. This is exclusively due to the special focus of the conference. We definitely do not think that women cannot be good philosophers and we explicitly distance ourselves from any claims that point in this direction.